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INTRODUCTION

Modem legal scholarship has lofty ambitions for law. Some would
enlist the courts in utopian social reform, hoping that visionary

adjudication will bring about a more egalitarian, more caring, more
civically responsible, or otherwise more perfect society. Others would
turn to social science to generate new blueprints for law. Thus, feminist
scholars have argued that law should be feminized,' or that society
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to Larry
Alexander, Kevin Clermont, Leo Katz, Maimon Schwarzschild, and Christopher
Wonnell for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-4,
70-72 (1988).

should be restructured through legislation,2 while economists have
proposed comprehensive changes in entitlements.3
It is not my intention to evaluate the substance of these different

scholarly programs, but only to show why they may be too extravagant
in their ambitions for law. Of course, academic criticism of law can be
as ambitious as it likes, since it can do little harm and may occasionally
provide new insights and ideas. But the best forms of practical legal
decision-making are limited in ways that force them to ingest new ideas
slowly.
This argument is based on certain inherent characteristics of legal
rules. Rules are designed to reduce error by prescribing actions that, in
the run of cases, will produce better results than the subjects of rules
would obtain if they judged for themselves what to do. At the same
time, rules sometimes produce errors when applied to particular cases.
If the sum of error under rules is less than the sum of error rules prevent,
then the rule-making authority has reason to issue "serious" rules-rules
to be followed in every case. Because rules are imperfect, however, the
subjects of rules do not always have good reason to follow them. This
means that the authority cannot achieve all that it would like to achieve
through rules unless its subjects are somehow distracted from reasoned
evaluation of what they ought to do. To some extent, the authority may
be able to provide such distraction through sanctions or deception, but
neither will be fully effective.
From these premises about the operation of legal rules, this paper
draws some conservative conclusions. The most important of these is
that the success of a legal system depends significantly on a habit of
obedience among its subjects. The habit of obedience, however, may be
disrupted if law ventures too far from prevailing practices and beliefs or
upsets too many private expectations. This unsolvable problem dims the
prospects for comprehensive social reform through law.

Throughout

the analysis that follows,

this

paper takes

a

consequentialist approach to law. Without reaching any conclusions
about the nature of personal morality, it assumes that law and
government are consequentialist enterprises, designed to advance some
2.

See, e.g.,

AND CIVIL RIGHTS:

ANDREA DVoRKiN & CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY
A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN's EQUALrTY (1988).

3. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV.
L. REV. 509 (1986) (proposing that compensation for takings of property be replaced by
a system of private insurance against the effects of government activities on property

values). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11-21 (1995) (discussing
legal "pragmatism" and law and economics). Posner acknowledges the importance of
stable legal rules, and expressly disavows any wish to replace law with economic theory;
yet lie appears to have substantial faith in the ability of pragmatic judges to rationalize

legal methods. See id.
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set of goals and ideals by the most effective means. This leaves room
for society to pursue a variety of objectives, including, among others, the
freedom of individuals to pursue their own conceptions of a good and
fair distribution of resources.
II. SERIOUS RuLEs
The first step in this argument is to defend the role of rules in a good
legal system-one that supports a successful society and advances its

values. As this article explains, a governing authority has reason not
only to enact rules but also to present them as "serious" rules. That is, it
has reason to direct its subjects to act in certain predetermined ways

without considering whether its directions are correct when applied to a
particular case.4
Serious rules stand in contrast to "rules of thumb," or advisory rules,

which are offered to rule-followers as non-binding guides to action A
rule of thumb is not really a rule at all, because one who understands a
rule in this way is free to conclude that, with due regard for the
advantages of a practice of rule-following, the rule nevertheless should

be disregarded in the particular case at hand. A serious rule, in contrast,
is not just a particularly weighty rule of thumb, but a rule to be followed

without examining underlying reasons for action.
The quality of seriousness is closely related, but not identical, to the
quality of determinateness. 6 A determinate rule is one that is easily
4. Larry Alexander and I have made this point elsewhere, as has Frederick
Schauer. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, PAST IMPERFECT: RULES
PRINCIPLES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW ch. 5 (Duke Univ. Press, forthcoming 2000)
[hereinafter ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, PAST IMPERFECT]; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE 93-100 (1991); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive
Nature of Rules, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 1191, 1194-99 (1994) [hereinafter Alexander &
Sherwin, Rules]. See also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 16-19, 22-23, 30-33 (1979) (discussing "exclusionary reasons").
5. See SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 4-5, 94-100 (discussing rules of thumb and
"rule-sensitive particularism"); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3
(1955) (discussing summary rules); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections
on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1004 (1989) (discussing rules of
thumb).
6. For arguments in defense of the capacity of words to carry determinate
meaning, see SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 53-62; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 568-70, 607-21
(1993). On the distinction between relatively determinate rules and relatively
indeterminate "standards," see, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic

Unlike
understood and does not call for normative judgment.
seriousness, determinateness is a matter of degree: a rule may be more or
less certain in application, but it either is or is not a statement of what
the actor ought to do. Yet, although determinateness differs from
seriousness, it can undermine seriousness in an indirect way. If, for
example, the authority moves from a rule "Do not make a statement you
know to be false," to a rule "Do not engage in harmful deception," the
notion of harmful deception will require normative interpretation and
this, in turn, will entail some consideration of the reasons underlying the
rule. The rule is still serious in that it requires people to avoid harmful
deception (whatever that is understood to mean) without further
deliberation. But its effect on conduct will not be as consistent as that of
the rule of "Do not make a statement you know to be false." At some
point, the rule may be so indeterminate that it is incapable of constraint,
and so cannot be called a serious rule (such as: "Respect autonomy" or
"Do what is best").
A. Reasonsfor Serious Rules
There are well-known reasons why a governing authority might issue
rules of conduct, even if the authority and all its subjects agree on a
common set of ends.' The first is a disparity in information. Rules can
improve the performance of individual actors if the authority from which
they come has greater knowledge or expertise than most of the actors to
whom they are addressed. Examples are a doctor's advice about
antibiotics, a weather service's order to evacuate, and customs that
represent many generations' experience with what works well in
common situations. To the extent that a law-making authority can
gather or tap superior information, its subjects will better conform to
their own ends by following the authority's rules.'
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 261-71 (1974); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560-62 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1701-13 (1976).
7. For useful catalogues of reasons for rules, see TOi D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL
THEORY OF ETHIcAL POSITIVIsM 49-58 (1996); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
75 (1986); SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 135-66; Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in
THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POsITvIsM 287, 304-05 (Robert P. George

ed., 1996).
8. See RAz, supra note 7, at 70-80 (discussing the "normal justification" for
authoritative rules and pointing out that superior wisdom is one source of justification);
SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 149-55 (discussing decision-maker error); Robert C. Clark,
Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1703, 1718-19 (1989) (arguing that elites are superior rulemakers because they have
access to special information or are better processors of information than private parties);
Coleman, supra note 7, at 305 (citing superior information as ajustification for rules).
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If the information the authority possessed could somehow be
conveyed to actors, then there would be no need for rules. But this is
seldom possible. Consider, for example, a jury listening to medical
evidence.9 A doctor testifies that, in his opinion, the pain in the
plaintiff's legs is caused by circulatory problems and is not the result of
a collision between plaintiff and defendant. The doctor may explain his
opinion, and he may even demonstrate by pointing out the affected area
on a plastic model of a spine. But he cannot, in several hours'
testimony, make the jury understand what he understands about
circulation and spines. The main function of his explanatory testimony
is to allow the jury to view his demeanor and evaluate his credibility as
an expert. Even this is something they can only do intuitively. Because
they do not understand the subject matter, they have no substantial basis
for evaluating his expert competence. In the end, they will decide
whether he seems to be honest and attended a well-known university. If
they approve of him, they will accept whatever he says about the
plaintiff's spine. 0 Thus, because of the difficulty of imparting expertise
to unskilled audiences, the authority may prefer to issue a serious rule of
conduct, rather than attempt to explain more complex reasons for action
to the public.
A second, related reason why an authority might issue rules is that
rules can counteract the effects of common cognitive errors. There is
much evidence that, even given an ample body of information, the
human mind cannot be counted on to reason in an orderly and accurate
way. Cognitive scientists, most notably Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, have shown how normally useful cognitive shortcuts such as
"representativeness" (similarity, taken to indicate correlation) or
"availability" (salience or familiarity, taken to indicate frequency) can
lead to errors of judgment."
9. For a thorough examination of deference to expert testimony, see generally
Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L. J.
1535 (1998).

10.

See id. at 1539, 1616-30. Brewer suggests that nonexperts may be able to

employ a form of abductive reasoning to assess expert testimony on the basis of experts'
credentials, but ultimately finds this insufficient to ensure fair decision-making in legal
proceedings. See id.
11. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:

Heuristicsand Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 414 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY];
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor Judging Frequency
and Probability,in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra at 163 [hereinafter Tversky

For example, we have a false sense of immunity against harm, as

shown by the fact that a majority of people consider themselves better
than average drivers and expect to live past eighty. Why might we see

things this way?

Because the most available data-our personal

experience and the dramatic events we read about-suggest that
accidents and death happen most often to other people.12 We also

grossly miscalculate the prevalence of different causes of death, ranking
accident and disease equally when death from disease actually prevails

by sixteen to one. 3 Why? Because the interesting deaths we read about
in the newspaper are mainly accidents rather than deaths from disease."4

Another common type of error, on which a great deal of human energy
has been spent, is the illusion that we can control chance events. A
simple example is that gamblers place higher bets on the outcome of a

dice throw when they have not yet thrown the dice than when the throw
is complete but the result has not been revealed. This may not be a
heuristic so much as the5 product of human desire to control the

surrounding environment.

& Kahneman, Availability].
12. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceivedRisk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 11, at 463, 468-70.
13. See id. at 467.

14. See id. Similarly, we overestimate our own contributions to joint projects. In
a study of husbands and wives, the spouses' combined assessments of responsibility for
various tasks, obtained separately from each, almost always add up to more than 1.0.
The likely reason is that each has a much easier time picturing his or her own effort. See

Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 11, at 179, 183-85.
15. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 11, at 231. The cognitive habits that produce these errors are
not just sloppy practices that we ought to avoid-they are strategies that work more often
than not. Similarities often do indicate a correlation, and the most familiar or readily
available facts are often those that occur most frequently. Moreover, strategies of this
kind are indispensable for creatures with limited time and energy. Even a minimal
analysis of all the acts (and omissions) we engage in during the course of a day would
leave us paralyzed. In effect, the cognitive biases Kahneman and Tversky describe are
rules for judgment, which normally allow us to reach roughly accurate conclusions but
sometimes lead us into trouble.
Howard Margolis makes a more radical point, arguing that our thought process is not a
process of reasoning in the sense associated with mathematical logic. Rather, we "think"
by means of "pattern recognition," a skill that has evolved in Darwinian fashion from the
simplest neural responses to stimuli. When we face a new situation, certain features of
that situation act as cues that prompt a more familiar pattern already lodged in memory,
and so allow us to jump to an initial conclusion. Then we refine our judgment by a
process of comparison with other known patterns, prompted by closer looks. In this way

we might arrive at logic, but we do not engage in logic. See HOWARD MARGOLIS,
PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A THEORY OF JUDGMENT 1-6, 42-86 (1987). If
Margolis is correct, then it is quite natural that we should form strong habits of mind that
push us to see things in one way and inhibit us from seeing them in other, logically
plausible ways. There is no use trying to avoid these habits, because pattern recognition
is our basic mental process.
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Cognitive patterns or strategies and the errors they produce become a
justification for serious legal rules if the rule-making authority can
predict and correct for common mistakes. For example, the authority
might impose speed limits to rein in overconfident drivers, or more
controversially, it might require seat belts. More controversial still, it
might prohibit gambling to counteract the gambler's fallacy and the
illusion of control.
Cognitive error cannot serve as a wide-ranging justification for serious
rules, because a law-making authority is necessarily composed of
individuals who can only hope to reason in the normal human way-that
is, faultily. There are cases in which a central authority is specially
situated to minimize cognitive error. For example, if the authority
encounters many instances of the same problem and a correct response
depends primarily on an assessment of risks, the authority has both the
motive and the necessary scale of operation to verify its judgment with
rigorous statistical analysis. On the other hand, when there is doubt
about the variables that ought to be included in the calculation, there is

no reason to equate authority with cognitive superiority. Speed limits
are a good case for rules, gambling less so.
A third reason why a law-making authority might issue rules is to
solve coordination problems that individual actors cannot overcome on
their own. 6 The coordination problems most often addressed by law
arise when each individual's reasons for action depend on the conduct of
others. 7 The only effective solution to a problem of this kind is to adopt
16.

On the coordination function of rules, see, for example, CAMPBELL, supra note

7, at 50, 53, 58; SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 163-66; RAz, supra note 7, at 49-50;
Coleman, supra note 7, at 304-05; Gerald J. Postema, Coordinationand Convention at
the Foundationsof Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982).
17. Problems of coordination can also arise with respect to a single individual's
reasons for action at different points in time, as in the case of procrastination or
addiction. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FuMERTON, REASON AND MORALITY: A DEFENSE OF
THE EGocENTRiC PERSPECTIVE 178-88 (1990) (discussing procrastination); THOMAs C.
SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57-112 (1984) (discussing strategies of selfcontrol and self-command); Scott J. Shapiro, Rules and Practical Reasoning, 138-209
(1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author)
(discussing various problems of self-constraint). For example, suppose you are living in
a cold climate and you have just lost your last pair of gloves. You know there is more
cold weather coming, but today is tolerably warm. If you have better things to do than
shop for gloves, and you expect the stores will still be there tomorrow, it is not rational
to spend time shopping. The difficulty is that the same is true every day. If you awake
one day to a hard freeze, and find that you have no gloves, you have made a mistake.
But it is difficult to say just how (or, more precisely, when) your calculations went
wrong.

and follow a rule. In the simplest cases, there is little or no reason to act
in one way or another, but there are powerful reasons why everyone
should act alike. For example, to avoid chaos we need a common
language and common rules to direct the flow of traffic. A law-making
authority can solve problems of this kind simply by designating a rule
for all to follow.
More commonly, actors have reason to act in one way or another, but
the balance of reasons for action depends on what others are likely to do.
In a group of any size, predicting the actions of others (whose reasons
for action similarly depend on the actions of everyone else) is impossible
to do. Therefore no one can make a sound choice. Again, a law-making
authority can solve the problem by issuing rules. As long as the rules
are generally followed, they will enable individuals to act in concert.
Most legal rules governing conflicting activities or the use of scarce
resources-that is, most of the private law of property, tort, and contract
-are of this sort.
The three justifications for rules described above-the authority's
superior expertise, common cognitive errors on the part of subjects, and
the need for coordination-are based on the assumption that the rulemaking authority and its subjects agree on the ends the authority is
trying to achieve. Of course, this is not always the case, and divergent
ends create another reason for rules. Individual ends may diverge from
those of the authority in at least two ways. The individual may simply
disagree with whatever ends the authority has adopted on behalf of
society as a whole. For example, the authority may think it important

that resources be distributed fairly evenly, while the individual may
think it is important that resources be distributed to reward merit, or that
resources be distributed to himself. Alternatively, the authority may
establish an institution that all individuals would endorse in a state of
Rawlsian ignorance about their own circumstances, but that does not
serve the concrete interests of all people. Private property laws, for
example, are designed to generate social goods, such as wealth, by the
indirect means of allocating resources to individuals. 8 But not everyone
In a sense, this is simply a problem of information (you should have checked the
forecast) or of error in assessing risk. But the problem is complicated by time. You
cannot coordinate your own actions because your reasons for action now are dependent
on your reasons for action later, and you do not know what circumstances will shape
your reasons for action at all the relevant points in time.
18. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-18 (C.K.
Ogden ed. & Richard Hildreth trans., Routlege & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1931) (discussing the
contribution of property rights to utility); RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 32-35 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing the contribution of property rights to efficiency).
Maximization of welfare through the creation of incentives for productive use of
property is just one of the possible justifications for private property rights. For a survey
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benefits from property laws. A person who controls a very small share
of wealth and has little capacity to generate wealth by labor may place
less weight than the authority does on societal prosperity. In either of
these cases, the authority has reason to control the conduct of dissenters
by means of rules.
Rules of this kind-that is, rules that settle disagreements about ends
and values-can be viewed as coordination rules, if coordination is
broadly understood to include social and political compromise. 9 If
people differ about particular ends, but agree that settlement of their
differences is more important than pursuit of the ends in question, then
rules that impose a settlement serve a common interest in stability and
mutual predictability that no one can pursue alone. Of course, there may
be some who value pursuit of their own ends more than they value
settlement of differences, in which case the rule simply imposes the will
of the authority and those it represents on dissenters. It is not the
purpose of this Article to explore the conditions in which an authority is
justified in imposing its will in this way; therefore this Article assumes
the authority acts only when conditions of political justice have been
met.
B. Imperfections of Rules
In the ways just described, a governing authority may be able to
improve the lives and well-being of its subjects by enacting rules of
conduct. In many cases, however, rules in operation do not perfectly
correspond to the reasons that led to their enactment. This is because the
rules are necessarily blunt; in order to function as rules, they must
translate reasons for action into specific instructions applicable to classes
of cases.Y It follows that strict compliance with rules will entail a
certain amount of error, judged by the reasons on which the rules are
based.2'
Rules also produce "discontinuities" in law-differences in treatment

of the topic, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 57-67 (1977).
19. See Postema, supra note 16, at 172-78 (stating that coordination must be
mutually beneficial but need not be equally beneficial to all parties).

20. In Fred Schauer's terms, rules are "instantiation[s]" of broader "background
SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 54 (emphasis omitted).
21. See id. at 31-34, 47-52 (discussing entrenchment of generalizations and

justification[s]."

accompanying qualities of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness).

that seem arbitrary by the light of any theory under which law might be
organized. This is easiest to see when the rule is consequentialist in
origin. Suppose we have settled on a goal of maximizing X, which we
consider to be an element of human welfare. We decide that X would be
served by serious rule A: "Do not kill another person." In fact, we
believe that on some occasions killing someone would maximize X, but
we also think that people are likely to misjudge the relation of killing to
X, and we expect that some people will not care about X, so we adopt the
rule. We also decide to adopt rule B: "No one is required to save another
from peril." Again, we think there will be cases in which requiring a
rescue would advance X, but we are worried that a general duty to rescue
would too often prevent individuals from pursuing their own projects.
We also find that we are unable to refine a duty to rescue in a
manageable way, so we adopt rule B as a serious rule.
One obvious result of serious rules A and B is that in some of the cases
covered by their terms, they will forbid the action that best serves X.
This is the ordinary problem of error due to the bluntness of rules.
Another consequence is that there may be extreme applications of rule A
and extreme applications of rule B that seem indistinguishable, and
hence arbitrary, according to the underlying goal of maximizing X.
When this is so, the consequentialist goal itself (maximize X) is
embarrassed.
Consider the following example provided by Leo Katz. A hospital
administrator cannot afford enough equipment to sustain all the patients
who may need life support. Normally, rules A and B prevent him from
disconnecting one patient's life support in order to save another who has
a better chance of recovery. The hospital administrator then discovers

another type of life support equipment, a machine that must be briefly
disconnected and serviced every few days. The result suddenly changes.
Once the machine is disconnected for service, there is no duty under rule
B to reconnect it to the first, less promising patient. The hospital
administrator is now free to save the second patient at the expense of the
first. But, how can a consequentialist theory tolerate such disparate
outcomes when the consequences at stake are precisely the same and the
only difference lies in the mechanical features of the equipment?2
Katz suggests that discontinuities of this type discredit
consequentialism, and can be explained much more easily by a
deontological view of law and morality., Yet, an authority that wants to
enforce a moral law against those who do not understand or are not
22.

See

LEO KATZ, ILL-GoTEN GAINs: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD,

KiNDRED PuzzLEs OF THE LAW 58-59 (1996).

23. See id. at 56.

AND
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motivated by that law faces the same problem as the consequentialist
authority: it must use rules that are blunter than, and even conflict with,
the moral law. "Do not lie" may be a broader prohibition than is
warranted by the principle of respect for autonomy, and in fact may
sometimes prevent what is right to do (for example, it might be telling
someone in a murderous rage that there is no gun in the drawer). Yet, if

people who are not morally inclined are likely to misunderstand or take
advantage of a more discriminating rule, the blunt rule, "Do not lie,"
may be the best form in which to cast a morally inspired law.
Another way in which rules introduce defects into law is by inhibiting
change. If a rule promises to prevent errors in judgment more often than
it causes errors by preempting judgment, the authority has reason to
issue the rule. But if circumstances change or new and better ideas
emerge while the rule remains in place, the favorable
24 balance may no
longer hold and the rule may do more harm than good.
Of course, there are various escape routes from obsolete rules. If a
rule appears to be causing too many erroneous results, the authority can
repeal or amend it.2' Short of this, there are informal ways to alter
serious rules. Because no rule is perfectly determinate, there will always
be some opportunity for adjustment through interpretation.26 And at
some point, the level of obedience by individual actors and of judicial
enforcement is likely to drop if the rule is regularly producing bad
results. Particularly in a democracy that protects speech and is
prosperous enough to support a variety of commentaries on legal rules
and judicial outcomes, obsolete rules cannot survive indefinitely.2
Nevertheless, serious rules have a conservative effect. An authority
with broad responsibilities cannot be counted on to act quickly when
24. This does not mean that a society that employs serious legal rules cannot
improve itself or respond to change. First, nothing I have said suggests that law should
consist entirely of serious, determinate rules. Rules are justified only when the authority

has epistemic or cognitive advantages, or coordination is important, or the authority is
acting to enforce a necessary political compromise. In areas that do not require
immediate coordination and for which the authority does not have reliable information, a
rule of thumb, or a standard too indeterminate to have serious effect, or a zone of

adjudicatory discretion, may be a better solution.
25. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90-91, 93 (1961) (discussing the
static quality of primary rules and the need for secondary rules of change).
26. See SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 207-28 (discussing various approaches to
interpretation of rules).

27. For the view that dissent needs affirmative support against the force of the

status quo, see
AMERICA

STEVEN

91-120 (1999).

H.

SIFRU,

DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF

rules need correction. It may lag behind the insights of actors who are
closer to the circumstances of daily life, and therefore fail to notice that a
rule is performing poorly or to perceive that the rule could be improved
with the help of new scientific or intellectual tools. The authority may
also have a bureaucratic self-interest in maintaining established rules.2
Meanwhile, the habit of obedience may lead individuals to continue
complying and judges to continue enforcing rules for some time after the
justification for the rules has lapsed.
Thus, a legal system that employs serious rules and wins general

acceptance for its rules will be resistant to change, and this will add to
the errors generated by rules. But this does not necessarily mean that
rules are unjustified. If a rule can prevent more error than it will cause,
it is rational for the authority to adopt the rule. And, if actors and judges
are likely to err in judging when the rule is obsolete, and their errors of

judgment are likely to exceed the errors of continuing compliance, the
authority has reason to insist on compliance as long as the rule remains
in place.
C. The Irrationalityof FollowingRules
A governing authority has good reasons to enact rules, and yet what
the rules dictate will not always be the best course of action, all things
considered. What this means is that, if rationality is understood to mean
acting on one's best judgment on the balance of reasons for action as one
perceives them, it may be irrational to comply with a good rule.' If
actors were always correct in their assessment of when they ought to
obey rules, this would not be a problem. The authority could simply cast
its rules as advisory rules: follow this rule unless there is a good reason
not to. But if actors are likely to err in judging when to obey, the rules
will not be effective unless they are serious rules that demand
compliance in every case. The result is a dilemma for law: even when
rule-makers and their subjects agree on ends, it is rational for the rulemaker to insist on compliance but irrational (in the sense of rationality
previously described) for subjects to comply."
28. See Clark, supra note 8, at 1719-20 (discussing agency costs of elite decisionmaking).
29. This point is made forcefully in Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100

YALE L.J. 1611, 1620, 1625-28 (1991). See also Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and

Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 827, 873-83 (1989) (agreeing that rules cannot
prevent actors from considering reasons for action, but suggesting that actors may be
able to limit the scope of their reasoning processes); Regan, supra note 5, at 1006-18,
1028-31 (arguing that conscientious decision-makers cannot treat rules as conclusive
reasons for action).
30.

See

RoLF SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNDucT AND SocIAL NORMs

53-68 (1975)
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To some extent, the enactment of a rule can alter its subjects' reasons
for action and narrow the distance between the rule-maker's point of
view and that of its subjects." For example, if the actor understands that
the rule is based on special information known to the rule-maker or on
the rule-maker's ability to recognize and correct common biases, the
actor has reason to think that what the rule requires is normally the right
thing to do. The rule has epistemic value: it creates a reason for belief
that one ought to follow it, and so indirectly a reason for action.32
In rare cases, the epistemic value of the rule is conclusive. For

example, a small investor might adopt the following rule: "Buy only
mutual funds that are indexed to reflect the market as a whole." This is a
perfect rule (ex ante), because the pricing generated by the combined
efforts of all investors is so comprehensive that no single investor could
hope to do better except by random luck.33 It is therefore rational for the
investor to adopt the rule: he will do better over time by following it
than he would do independently. Further-and this is the interesting
feature of this case-it is rational to follow the rule unquestioningly.
Compliance is always rational because the market is smarter than every
investor, in every case, is.
More often, however, what the rule dictates is right for most but not
all cases. The existence of such a rule may still affect the actor's reasons
for action, but it will not provide the actor with a conclusive reason to
obey. Consider, for example, an evacuation order issued by the weather
service. The order is justified on the ground that the service has better
information than most people have about the magnitude of an
approaching storm and because people systemically underestimate the
risk of harm from storms. Among those subject to the order are several
(arguing that, while actors cannot suspend their rational judgment, they have reason to
create institutions that force them to treat rules as reasons for action); SCHAUER, supra
note 4, at 128-34 (assuming that it is sometimes irrational for actors to follow rules and
nevertheless rational for the governing authority to impose and enforce the rules); Larry

Alexander, Law and ExclusionaryReasons, 18 PHIL. Topics 5, 9-13 (1990) (arguing that
an authority has reason to demand that actors treat rules as serious rules, although actors
do not always have sufficient reason to obey).
31.

For the view that rules can alter reasons for action, see Alexander, supra note

30, at 7-8; Postema, supra note 16, at 179-82; William Powers, Jr., StructuralAspects of
the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianismand Social Contract Theory, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263, 1270-93 (1978).
32. See Hurd, supra note 29 at 1615-16 (discussing "theoretical authority" as a
source of reasons for belief).
33.

See JONATHAN R. MAcEY,

AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANcIAL THEORY

37-46, 59-75 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the implications of stock market efficiency).

people who wrongly believe that their homes are strong enough to
withstand any storm, and one who rightly believes that an elderly parent
will suffer serious harm in a move. Overall, it is better to make the rule
a serious rule (thereby saving those who are mistaken), than to make it
an advisory rule (allowing the one who judged correctly to follow his
judgment).
Yet, this does not ensure that the evacuees, as rational decisionmakers, will follow the rule. The evacuees may understand perfectly
well the reasons for the order, but if they are aware of the nature of rules,
they will also understand that the order is imperfect: the direction it
gives is correct for most cases but not for all. Thus, for each evacuee,

the order creates a fairly strong reason to believe that most people are
likely to err, but only a weak reason to believe that he himself has erred.
If the evacuee is confident of his own judgment, he will assume that
evacuation is right for others but not for him. In other words, an actor
may approve of a rule, understand its virtues, and endorse its issuance,
and nevertheless conclude that it would be wrong to comply3M
From the authority's point of view, the best course is still to issue a
serious rule and demand compliance by all. It may be that evacuation is
a mistake in the case of the elderly parent. If the authority could
anticipate this mistake, the solution would be an exception to the rule. It
is never possible to foresee all mistakes, and, as long as the errors the
rule prevents (harm to those who miscalculate the risk of harm) exceeds
the errors it causes (harm to an elderly parent), the authority should
insist that everyone comply. In this way, the perspectives of the
authority and its subjects diverge: the authority believes it has good
reason to issue a serious rule and its subjects believe they have good
reason to disobey.
Rules designed to solve coordination problems suffer from a similar
difficulty. The value of a coordination rule is that it enables actors
whose reasons for action depend on the actions of others to predict what
those others will do. Therefore, enactment of the rule might be thought
to create a reason to comply: any actor's violation of the rule will
undermine, to some degree, the benefits of coordination.35
Again, there will be cases in which the new reason for action that
arises from enactment of a coordination rule is conclusive, or nearly so.
If the rule simply fixes a convention ("drive on the right"), most or all
34. Larry Alexander and I make this argument in greater detail in ALEXANDER &
4, ch. 5, at 16-18.

SHERWIN, PAST IMPERFECT, supra note

35. See Postema, supra note 16, at 179-82 (explaining how conventions create
reasons for action); Regan, supra note 5, at 1025-26 (arguing that a coordination rule

creates a reason to believe that others will comply, and hence, indirectly, a reason to
comply),
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people will follow it because of the salience it gives to one of several

equivalent options.

That option promises coordination if everyone

obeys, and no one has reason to disobey. There is therefore no
divergence between the authority and its subjects and no need for a
serious, as opposed to advisory, rule.
Typically, however, there will be reasons to disobey a coordination
rule despite the benefits that it will yield if generally followed. Most
rules of law are of this type. A system of property rights, for example,
yields well-known benefits; and yet there are surely instances in which
theft is justified by someone's personal exigency.
When the possibility exists that someone will have reason to disobey
the rule, the rules have much less, if any, capacity to generate a reason
for action. As long as everyone knows that there is sometimes a good
reason to disobey, and also knows that they and others may err in
judging just when there is such a reason to disobey, no one can safely
assume that others will conform to the rule. This in turn means that one
actor's violation of the rule will have little or no effect on the expected
coordination benefits of the rule, because those benefits are already
uncertain. As a result, actors may understand the potential coordinating
benefits of the rule and approve of its enactment, and nevertheless
conclude quite often that they have reason to violate it. 6 Meanwhile, if
actors are frequently wrong in judging that they have reason to disobey,
and if the coordination benefits that come with full compliance exceed
the harm caused by compliance on the part of those who really ought to
disobey, the rule-making authority has reason to insist that everyone
obey. Once again, what a rational authority ought to require diverges

from what rational actors ought to do.
For example, suppose the authority has enacted a rule, "Keep off the
grass." You understand the benefits this rule will bring if it is obeyed
and you prefer not to break the rule if your breaking it will undermine

those benefits. It therefore appears that you have reason to obey. But if
you proceed to consider that occasionally people will have reason to
break the rule, and that more often people will think they have reason to
break the rule, you may conclude that your own violation will not add
much to the harm that otherwise is likely to occur. In this way, your
proposed reason to obey may disappear. If you don't break the rule,
someone else will. The rule-making authority, of course, would prefer
36. See ALxANDaa & SHERWvN, PAST IMPERFECT, supra note 4, at 23-25
(discussing rule-sensitive particularism as applied to coordination rules).
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that you not engage in this line of thought. Therefore, although the
authority might concede that a few people would have good reason to
break the rule, it will prefer that everyone obey."
The divergence between the authority's reasoning and that of its
subjects is even clearer when rules are based on ends that some rulesubjects reject. If an actor disagrees with the immediate ends of the rule
but values compromise, the problem is one of coordination. Because the

existence of the rule does not ensure that others will comply, the actor's
failure to comply is not likely to undermine an otherwise reliable

compromise; therefore, the actor has little or no reason to comply. If, on
the other hand, the actor does not value compromise, the rule has no
effect at all on his reasons for action. Thus, from the actor's perspective,
it is irrational to comply, while from the authority's perspective, the
benefit of the rule will be lost unless everyone complies.
What has been said so far establishes the initial premises on which the
rest of this paper, and in particular its conservative conclusions, are
based. There are some instances, at least, in which the right choice for a
rule-making authority is to insist on universal compliance with imperfect
rules. If its subjects were left to decide for themselves when to obey,
error and uncertainty would undermine the epistemic and coordinating
value of its rules. At the same time, rule-subjects are sometimes right to
disobey the rules. They are right to disobey because what the rules
require is not always what they ought to do, all things considered.
The following sections of the paper will describe why neither
enforcement of rules nor efforts to deceive rule-subjects about rules and
sanctions can satisfactorily resolve the discrepancy between what the
authority ought to demand and what its subjects ought to do in regard to
rules. This will lead to the conclusion, which is that law is not a good
medium for radical social change.

III. STRATEGIES OF SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH RULES, AND
THEIR LIMITs

A.

Enforcement

The argument so far is this: however rational it may be for a lawmaking authority to impose serious rules on its subjects, the inevitable
37. Something of this kind occurs in the context of voting: from the standpoint of
any individual voter, it is irrational to vote, and yet from the standpoint of a democratic
authority, it is best that all people vote. On the problem of voting and rational choice,
see, for example, BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS, AND DEMOCRACY 20
(1978); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2138-46

(1996).
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errors of rules mean that it will not always be rational for subjects to
obey. An individual actor may accept the authority's ultimate ends,
endorse the set of rules it has enacted as the best means for collective
pursuit of those ends, understand the risk of error and the bad example
that rule violation might set for others, and still disagree with the result
the rule requires in a given case. At the same time, the actor may be
wrong, and if actors are wrong more often than not, the authority will
prefer compliance in every case.
To narrow the distance between its subjects' reasoning and its own,
the authority might impose sanctions on those who disobey. For a
rational actor, the possibility of a sanction provides an additional reason
(a reason of self-interest) to comply with a law that the actor would
otherwise think it best to disobey. If the sanction is effectively designed
and fully enforced, it will make compliance rational."5
In our own legal system, enforcement of rules is complicated by the
practice of compensation. Rules are backed not only by the threat of
punishment, but also by the promise of civil remedies for those who are
harmed by legal wrongs. Victims are entitled, at the expense of
wrongdoers, to remedies that will place them as nearly as possible in the
positions they would have been in if no wrong had been done.

There are at least two reasons why enforcement of rules through
judicially administered remedies will never bring about a perfect
correspondence between the authority's reasoning and that of its
subjects. The most basic difficulty is that rules are not self-executing;
they must be applied by judges who are themselves rational actors and
who presumably think it wrong to punish a justified actor." Rules
38. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 242-50 (discussing criminal sanctions and their
effect on rational decision-making).
39. See DOUGLAS LAYcOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 11-19 (2d ed. 1994)
(providing materials and questions on the objective of restoring plaintiffs to their
"rightful positions"); see also Emily L. Sherwin, An Essay on Private Remedies, 6 CAN.
J.L. & JuRIs. 89 (1993) (exploring reasons for private compensatory remedies). For
influential views on corrective justice, see, for example, JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS 303-406 (1993); RcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 313323 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian
Constraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman:
Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 381 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward A Moral
Theory of Negligence Law, 2L. & PHIL. 37 (1983).
40. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishingthe Justified, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2203,

sometimes dictate the wrong result. When they do, it is not only
irrational for actors to follow the rule, but also morally distasteful for
judges to punish those who rightly disobey.4
Judges may be more alert than individual actors to the systemic
consequences of disobedience, particularly when disobedience is left
unpunished. They may understand that if they fail to enforce a rule
against someone who was justified in violating the rule, this will
encourage others who wrongly think that they are justified to violate the
rule as well.4" Yet there will be cases in which the judge believes that,
even after due allowance is made for the systemic consequences of an
unpunished violation, the violation was justified. And it is wrong for the
judge to enforce the rule in these cases.
What this means is that as long as judges desire to act fairly and
understand the imperfections of rules, the threat of sanctions will not
bring about full compliance. If actors expect fair treatment from judges,
then an actor who believes he is doing the right thing, based on the same
set of reasons that led the authority to issue the rule, must also believe

that a judge is unlikely to impose sanctions on him for disobedience. As
a result, potential sanctions will not have much effect on the reasoning
of a well-meaning actor4 3 Their effect will be limited to conscious "bad
men"-those who know they are acting contrary to the reasons
underlying the rules.
The authority might respond by insisting that judges enforce rules
according to their terms in all cases and threatening to impose sanctions
on judges who fail to enforce rules. If credible, this threat would make it
rational for judges to enforce the rules, and actors accordingly would
expect to be punished for all violations. But the same enforcement
problems that affect rules recur at this level. If it appears to whomever
2279-2321, 2323 (1992) (arguing for correspondence between the justifiability of acts
and the justifiability of punishment).
41. The level of enforcement must be discounted further if judges respect
principles of retributive justice that forbid punishment of those who did not intend or
expect to do wrong. See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among
Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y

84 (1990) (discussing retribution and mistake). See generally H.L.A. HART,
9, 11-14, 17-25 (1960); Michael S. Moore, The Moral
Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILrrTY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179-82
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
42. See Hurd, supra note 40, at 2293-2310 (analyzing the effect of example on

PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSiBILrrY

justification);

"contagion").

Powers, supra note 31,

at 1271-72 (discussing the problem of

43. Even for a well-motivated actor, sanctions may have some effect if the actor is
risk averse and anticipates that judges may err in determining whether the actor was
justified in breaking the rule. Sanctions will not, however, be conclusive if the actor
believes he is justified and believes a future judge will probably recognize his
justification and refuse to enforce the rule.
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judges that the judge in question was correct in refusing to enforce the
rule, that person will be reluctant to impose sanctions on the disobedient
judge.
A second problem in enforcing serious rules is the effect of full
enforcement on the public's attitude toward law." Apart from their role
in securing compliance with rules, both civil and criminal remedies play
an important part in maintaining public belief in the value of law.
Respect for and allegiance to law are based at least in part on selfinterest: people are most likely to accept law when they believe that a
stable legal system has advantages for them or those they care about.
Principal among those advantages is security of expectations: law
provides order in people's relations with others.
On this view of law, the importance of remedies comes from a
particular feature of human psychology, our tendency to respond more

intensely to visible, proximate facts than to disembodied ideas. In other
words, adjudication and accompanying criminal and civil remedies
illuminate the value of law, by translating its benefits from the abstract
to the particular. Punishment of individual defendants, and perhaps
more important, compensation of individual victims for effects of legal
wrongs, create a stronger sense of security than the notions of rights and
deterrence can convey. Of course, not everyone who suffers a legal
wrong ends up with a legal remedy: most people do not sue and those
who do most often settle. Nevertheless, tales of adjudication are part of
our popular culture, and they shape our attitudes toward law even when
we ourselves are not involved.
The psychological impact of adjudicated cases almost certainly
exceeds that of abstract knowledge of law or data on the deterrent effect
of legal rules. One of the biases that affect human cognition is a bias in
favor of readily "available" information. In making predictions or
assessing the causes of events, our minds focus naturally on facts that
are salient and easy to retrieve from memory, such as events that carry
emotional interest.45 What people learn about lawsuits from newspapers,
44. See HART, supra note 25, at 38-39, 55-56, 86-88 (discussing the "internal
aspect" of rules, in which rules are accepted by their subjects as standards of conduct);
Sherwin, supra note 39, at 101-03 (discussing the role of remedies in maintaining faith in
law).
45. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, PHILOSOPIHY 269 (1927) ("[P]opular induction
depends upon the emotional interest of the instances, not upon their number."); Richard
E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in
KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 11, at 101, 111-15

television, or conversations with friends serves this function for law,
giving them a more acute sense of legal rights than they could obtain by
reading the Supreme Court Reporter or the Restatement of Torts.
With this in mind, suppose that a rule-making authority could induce
its judges, by penalties or persuasion, to enforce rules in every case that
came before them. This would help give serious effect to rules, but it
would also draw public attention to the defects of rules. When the effect
of rules is played out in engaging cases, the public will assess the results
of adjudication and will disapprove of a legal system that enforces rules
against individuals who have rightly disobeyed. Thus, while remedies
heighten public awareness of the benefits of legal rules, they can also
heighten the public's demand for remedial justice.
The result is a dilemma for the authority. Serious rules are the best
means for guiding and coordinating conduct. At the same time, serious
enforcement can affect public respect for law, and respect for law is
important to the maintenance of serious legal rules. The less the public
approves of the legal system, the less it will be inclined to accept its

rules without exception.
The nature of the problem, as well as the strength of public and
judicial response to remedial injustice, is illustrated by the history to
date of California's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law. 6 In 1993, a
twelve-year-old girl named Polly Klaas was abducted from her bedroom,
raped, and killed by a man who had twice been convicted of kidnapping.
The public was shocked by the story and joined Polly's father in
demanding tougher sentences for repeat criminals. 7
In March 1994, the California legislature responded with a mandatory
sentencing law requiring a sentence of life in prison for any defendant
who is convicted of a felony and has two prior convictions for "serious"
or "violent" felonies. The third felony need not be serious or violent: the
criminal is now "out."4S As enacted, the law allowed prosecutors to
strike prior convictions from the record "in furtherance of justice," but
said nothing about discretion for judges.' 9 Judges, after all, were the
feckless invertebrates who caused the problem in the first place. In
(discussing responses to abstract and concrete information); Kalneman & Tversky,
Availability, supra note 11, at 163 (explaining the availability heuristic).

46. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667 (b)-(i), 1170.12 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
47. After Polly was killed, Marc Kaas voiced support for a "Three Strikes" ballot
initiative sponsored by Mike Reynolds, whose daughter also had been murdered by
previously convicted felons. See Jane Gross, Drive to Keep Repeat Felons in Prison
Gains in California,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, § 1, at 1; Vlae Kershner & Greg Lucas,
"3 Strikes" Leader Warns Assembly He Doesn't Want Ballot Measure Softened, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 5, 1994, at A13.
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(c), (e)(1); 1170.12(a), (c)(1).

49. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(2); 1170.12 (d)(2).
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November of the same year, a substantially similar ballot initiative was
approved by seventy-three percent of California voters 0
Before long, however, hard cases cropped up. One man stole a slice
of pizza from some children at a pier,5' another stole three chuck steaks
from a grocery, 52 another was caught with one marijuana cigarette, 3 and
another stole a beer. 4 Each of these crimes was a third strike, calling for
twenty-five years to life. Judges regularly avoided the law by reducing
felony charges to misdemeanors, striking priors, or holding particular
applications of the law to be "cruel and unusual" punishment.55 Even
Polly Klaas's father called for leniency 6 Finally, the California
Supreme Court, hearing the appeal of a man caught in possession of a
tiny amount of cocaine, "interpreted" the Three Strikes law to give
judges the same discretion afforded to prosecutors to strike prior
convictions.' This interpretation-a rather odd one in light of the law's
evident purpose to impose discipline on lenient judges-was necessary,
the California court said, to avoid constitutional problems relating to the
separation of powers.5
It is not clear that the failure of the Three Strikes law to operate as a
serious rule is a cause for regret. A law inspired by a dramatic story like
that of Polly Klaas may not reflect the sort of superior information or
reasoning that justifies an authority in issuing serious rules. Yet, even if
we assume that the Three Strikes law was a good rule, one whose value
50.

Proposition 184 was approved on November 8, 1994 and codified as section

1170.12 of the California Penal Code. See Gordon Smith, Voters Reject Smoking,
Health-Care Initiatives, SAN DIEGo UNiON-TRIn., Nov. 9, 1994, at A3 (reporting
initiative results).
51. See Theft of Pizza Could Result in Life Imprisonment, SAN DIEGO UNION-

TRm., Aug. 4, 1994, at A3.
52. See Nicholas Riccardi, Stolen Shirt Among Possible Third Strikes: Prop. 184:
Callingfor Defeat of Tough Sentencing Initiative, Group Profiles 10 Offenders Who
Could Get 25 Years to Life in Prisonfor Minor Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at
B3.
53. See Michelle Locke, Judge Balks at '3-Strikes' Sentencing: Penalty Is Too
Harshfor Nonviolent Crime, He Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 1994, at A3.
54. See Lone Hearn, Many Caught in '3-Strikes' Net: Petty CriminalsAre Swept
in Willy-Nilly with Serious Felons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., June 19, 1994, at Al.
55. See, e.g., Leslie Wolf, Case Is Evidence that Tough Law Traps Judges Too,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIn., Oct. 16, 1994, at Al; Locke, supra note 53, at A3.
56. See Lou Cannon, A Dark Side to 3-Strikes Laws, WASH. POST, June 20, 1994,
at A15; Jon Matthews, Klaases Ask Governor to Replace '3 Strikes': They Prefer
MeasureAimed More at Violence, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRIB., Mar. 10, 1994, at A3.
57. See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628,633-49 (Cal. 1996).
58. See id. at 633.

as a warning to convicted felons outweighed the errors it would

sometimes produce, the picture of a man sent to prison for life for theft
of a chuck steak creates a poor impression of law in action.
The problem of remedial justice is aggravated by the temporal
circumstances of adjudication. 9 In a legal system that issues and
enforces rules, rules come into play at three points: once when
announced, again when individuals consult the rules in deciding how to
act, and finally when a violation has occurred or a dispute has arisen and
courts apply rules to adjust the positions of the actors involved.
Between these points, time passes, the information available to decisionmakers changes, and the field on which rules operate shifts from future
to present to past. Initially, the rule-making authority acts prospectively,
contemplating a range of events that have not yet materialized. Later,
when individual actors refer to the rule in making decisions about their
own conduct, a particular problem has taken shape, though it is not yet
clear what the consequences of action will be. Later still, when a judge
consults the rule to evaluate conduct, at least some of the effects of the
actor's conduct are known.
As the decision-maker's perspective changes, what is at stake in the
decision may change, or appear to change, as well. Some of the
functions of rules, such as creation of incentives, are prospective by
nature. Although adjudication under rules affects these functions, the
prospective value of rules is likely to lose its salience at the time of
adjudication. For example, a society may value both maximization of
total wealth and improvement of the position of those with few
resources. With an eye to wealth maximization, the governing authority
may issue clear rules of entitlement and transfer designed to encourage
enterprise and reassure the market that promises will be enforced. Yet
these are forward-looking goals, which turn on the ability of rules to
influence future conduct. Once a violation of property rights or a breach
of contract has occurred, the damage is done and, between parties, the
original objectives of property and contract rules are beside the point.
Distributive considerations, which played little part in the enactment of
the rules, may now appear in sharper focus.
Consider the case of Panco v. Rogers.6° Mr. Panco, an elderly
carpenter preparing to retire, signed a contract to sell the home he had
built for himself and his wife. The price stated in the contract was
$5,500, but Mr. Panco, who was deaf and had little schooling, believed
the price to be $12,500. The mistake grew out of oral negotiations
59. See Sherwin, supra note 39, at 104-09 (discussing the relation between rights
and remedies in an adjudicative setting).
60. Panco v. Rogers, 87 A.2d 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
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between Mr. Rogers, the buyer, and Mrs. Panco, who was not skilled in
English. Mr. Rogers, presumably acting in good faith, prepared a
contract stating the price he had heard, and Mr. Panco signed without
reading the agreement. The market value of the house was determined
to be $10,000. When his daughter discovered the mistake, Mr. Panco
promptly offered to return the buyers' down payment plus expenses, and
asked to be excused from his obligation to convey. When Mr. Rogers
refused, Mr. Panco sued to rescind the contract. 6 Applicable rules of
contract law, however, limited rescission to relatively narrow and
concrete circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake, and afforded no
relief for a unilateral error of this kind.62 Should the court stand by the

rules and enforce the contract, or should it allow Mr. Panco to avoid the
contract and keep the tiny assets he had saved for retirement?
This is not simply a case in which the governing rule is too blunt. It
may be that, taking into account the reasons for clarity and reliability in
contract law, the negative effects of an exception outweigh the hardship
to Mr. Panco, who might after all have been more careful. But the
change in perspective, from forward-looking enactment of rules to
backward-looking adjudication, makes the distributive elements of the
case particularly appealing in comparison with efficiency. Focusing on
Mr. Panco alone, incentives for efficient behavior are no longer at stake,
because he had already acted. At the same time, sympathy for his
position and distaste for Mr. Rogers's chilly response are very much in

play.
The changes that occur between enactment and application of rules
make it even more likely that strict enforcement will be unpalatable to
both judges and observers. They also expose conflicts among the
various ends an authority might wish to pursue through law. Ideally, the
authority would like both to promote efficiency and rescue the unlucky
Mr. Panco. Yet if future conduct and retrospective decisions are
governed by a single rule, the authority must choose one set of goals
over the other.
B. Deception
To work as effectively as possible, a legal system must sometimes use

serious and determinate rules. Yet it will not always be rational for
61.
62.

See id. at 771-72.
See id. at 773.

individual actors to comply with rules, because rules do not dictate the
right result for every case. In response, the rule-making authority may
introduce sanctions to enforce its rules. But the unwillingness of judges
to enforce rules strictly, the importance of remedial justice to the
public's attitudes toward law, and the salience of different ends at the
point of adjudication make it unlikely that sanctions will bring about full
compliance with rules.
Alternatively, the authority may be able to enhance the serious effect
of rules by engaging in several forms of deception. The simplest of
these relates to rules themselves. As Larry Alexander and I have argued
elsewhere, when a rule-making authority presents rules as serious rules
to be obeyed in every case, rather than advisory rules, it deceives its
subjects about the relationship between the rules and correct conduct. 63
It treats the rules as statements of what their subjects should do in every
case covered, when in fact they are only rough translations of reasons for
action, designed to obtain the best overall results.
Occasionally, the establishment of serious rules may involve active
deception: officials may openly urge, although they know better, that it

is personally right for everyone to obey the law in every case. More
often, the posture of officials is better described as lack of candor. In
issuing a rule, they do not disclose that there is a more abstract reason
behind the rule, which the rule does not perfectly realize. Knowing that
people are inclined to obey law from habit, convenience, or a sense of
duty, they do not invite their subjects to consider whether the actions
required by the rule are in line with its motives.
Perhaps even more often, there is no conscious deception or even lack
of candor, because officials themselves accept rules at face value. Now
the problem is one of self-deception. Both the authority and its subjects
simply act on rules and either fail or refuse to analyze the motives
behind them.6 In any event, in administering rules as serious rules,
officials cannot be simultaneously candid and reflective. They must
either engage in esoteric decision-making, without disclosing the
motives of rules to their subjects, or they must avoid thinking clearly
about the reasons for the rules they issue.
Another form of deception in which the authority might engage relates
to the grounds on which sanctions are imposed. Normally, laws act both
as conduct rules, addressed to individual actors, and as decision rules,
addressed to the judges who adjudicate disputes arising out of conduct.
Yet, it might be possible to separate these two functions of rules. 6
63. See Alexander & Sherwin, Rules, supranote 4, at 1192, 1194-1201.
64.
65.

See id. at 1193 (discussing self-deception in regard to rules).
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
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Consider, for example, Gerald Postema's interpretation of Bentham's
ideal legal system. Bentham favored a detailed and comprehensive code
of conduct rules, and at the same time suggested that judges should
decide disputes according to their best utilitarian judgment, even if this
meant disregarding the rules of the code.' To avoid the confusion that
would result from contradictory bodies of law, however, Bentham
suggested that judicial decisions should have no precedential effect.67
If the public is fully aware of both judicial decisions and codified
rules-as Bentham insisted it should be-it is difficult to see how such a
system could remain effective. The lack of correspondence between
decisions and codified rules would undermine the objective of
codification, which is to provide guidance and settle expectations."
Nevertheless, there is evidence that laws sometimes operate in much the
way Bentham proposed. In at least some areas of law, there is a
significant degree of "acoustic separation" between conduct rules and
subsequent decisions, so that a variance between conduct rules and
decision rules may often go unnoticed. 6 When this is the case, the rulemaking authority can pursue goals that would otherwise be at odds by
addressing different sets of rules to actors and to judges.
One striking example is the history of equity in English and American
law. For about seven centuries, equity was both juridically and
physically separate from law, existing first in the person of the
Chancellor, and then more formally in the Court of Chancery."
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-34 (1984) (distinguishing

between conduct and decision rules); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM 147-56 (2d ed. 1980) (distinguishing between duty-imposing laws and sanctionimposing laws).
66. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 40506,411,448-52 (1986).
67.

See id. at404,415,418-19.

68. See id. at 453-57.
69. Meir Dan-Cohen coined the term "acoustic separation." Dan-Cohen, supra
note 65, at 625. Dan-Cohen provides examples of acoustic separation and of what he
calls "selective transmission" of conduct rules and decision rules in criminal law, such as
hidden defenses and possibilities for leniency at different stages of the criminal process.
See id. at 634-48. He also raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the practice of
selective transmission. See id. at 665-77. See also Alexander & Sherwin, Rules, supra
note 4, at 1213-22 (discussing the effects of official deception on autonomy and public
debate).

70. For short histories of equity, see FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUrrY 2-10
(2d ed. 1920); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
675-707 (5th ed. 1956). The Chancellor was first a part of the King's entourage, then
holder of the King's seal, then gradually took on judicial duties, giving special relief to

Chancery was said to follow the law as announced by the law courts, but
in fact the Chancellor gave relief in some cases not covered by
established legal forms of action and recognized some defenses that the
law courts might not allow.7' The early Chancellors were ecclesiastics,

and throughout its history Chancery tended to favor notions of moral
duty over legal technicality. 2
It was no secret that two separate courts-law and equity-were

applying rules in rather different ways. But a critical distinction was
maintained. Unlike the courts of law, Chancery had no power to
establish titles to property or otherwise to determine the legal status of
the parties. Instead, the Chancellor simply acted on the "conscience" of
the defendant, issuing personal decrees that directed the defendant to act

or not to act in particular ways.73 Because the Chancellor never

attempted to alter the law, there was no direct conflict with the
judgments of the law courts. Of course, the Chancellor possessed the
power to commit the defendant to jail indefinitely if he disobeyed a
decree.74 Thus, as a practical matter, the directions given by the
Chancellor prevailed over the rights and duties provided by law.' But

in an era when form mattered, the formal division
in function meant that
76
there was no conflict between equity and law.
petitioners for whom no remedy existed at law. See MArrLAND, supra at 25;
PLUCKNErT, supra at 180-81, 695-96.
71. See Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) (disregarding the legal
requirement of privity and holding a buyer of land to be bound by a servitude of which
he had notice). See generally G.W. KEErON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 22 (6th ed.
1965); MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 2-5; 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 87-88, 1040-45 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1994); EDWARD
YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS 101-26
(1989).
72. See MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 4-6; PLUCKNETr, supra note 70 at 685-886; 1
POMEROY, supra note 71, at 71-75; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY
JURISPRUDENCE 299 (13th ed. 1886).

73. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUrrY-REsTITUTION
62-63 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing powers of equity courts); MArrLAND, supra note 70, at
9-10 (discussing the relation between law and equity); KEErON, supra note 71, at 10-11,
17 (discussing the nature of equity decrees); 2 POMEROY, supra note 71, §§ 428-430
(discussing the maxim that equity acts in personam).
74. On the contempt powers of equity courts, see generally DOBBS, supra note 73,
at 130-31, 135-59.
75. The power of the Chancellor to enjoin plaintiffs from bringing suit in the law
courts was confirmed by a royal decree in 1616. See MArrLAND, supra note 70, at 10;
PLUCKNErr, supranote 70, at 194, 699.
76. The mechanics and practice of early equity are illustrated in the case of J.R. v.
M.P, Y.B. 37 Hen. VI 13, pl. 3 (1459). J.R. had procured M.P.'s sealed note through a
species of fraud. M.P. initiated proceedings against J.R. before the Chancellor, who
ordered J.R. to deliver up M.P.'s note for cancellation and not to sue M.P. at law. When
J.R. refused to comply, the Chancellor committed him to jail for contempt. J.R. (acting
from jail) then sued M.P. in a court of law, to collect on the note. After some
deliberation, the justices held that the equity decree, being solely a matter of advice to
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This arrangement provided a very effective form of acoustic
separation, at least as long as Chancery decrees were seldom published
and its practice was shrouded in mystery. Courts claiming final
authority in matters of law enforced a set of remarkably rigid rules,
while the Chancellor quietly made adjustments in response to hardship
or misbehavior. In this way, the Chancery was able to provide equity in
the Aristotelian sense of correcting error in the application of rules,
without directly challenging the rules.
The formal division between law and equity eroded in the nineteenth

century and by the mid-twentieth century the two had merged in nearly
all jurisdictions and were administered by a single court.7 Yet even
under merged procedures, a special set of equitable defenses--defenses
such as hardship and "unclean hands"-may apply to historically

equitable remedies, but not to the legal remedy of damages."
Consequently, a court may recognize a plaintiff's claim but refuse to
enforce it by injunction or specific performance. If, as is often the case,
damages are insufficient to give full relief, the result is that the
plaintiff's underlying right turns out to be less valuable than the rules

that define it might suggest.79 The obscurity of the remedial doctrine,

J.R.'s conscience, did not affect the legal validity of the note. J.R. remained free to
collect, if he could manage it from jail. See id.
77. On the procedural merger of law and equity, see generally DOBBS, supra note
73, § 2.6(1); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL

PROCEDURE 461-80 (7th ed. 1997); 1 POMEROY, supra note 71, at 45-55.
78. On equitable defense, see DOBBS, supra note 73, at 66-85 (discussing equitable
discretion and equitable defenses); YORio, supra note 71, at 101-26 (surveying defenses

to specific performance); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in ContractEnforcement,

50 MD. L. REV. 253, 254-60 (1991) (discussing equitable defenses).
Defenses to the plaintiffs underlying legal claim, and therefore to the remedy of
damages, traditionally have been governed by more determinate rules such as the rules
defining fraud.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§

159-61 (1981)

(discussing fraud and related defenses); Sherwin, supra at 265-67 (discussing legal
defenses to contract enforcement). In contract law, the defense of unconscionability has
blurred to some extent the distinction between legal and equitable defenses. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (unconscionability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
supra, § 208 (unconscionability); Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The
Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-89 (1967) (distinguishing between
substantive and procedural unconscionability).
79. Consider the denouement of Panco v. Rogers, 87 A.2d 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1952), the case of the deaf carpenter who signed away his retirement savings. The
court finally determined that Mr. Panco was not entitled to rescission of the contract: Mr.
Rogers was not guilty of fraud and the mistake was only a unilateral mistake by Mr.
Panco. See 87 A.2d at 773. Therefore Mr. Panco was liable for damages for breach.
Yet the court also denied Mr. Roger's counterclaim for specific performance, on the
ground that "a judgment of specific performance would be harsh, oppressive, unjust,

however, creates a condition of acoustic separation: actors, and even
lawyers, are unlikely to consider the possibility of inadequate remedies
in advance of a dispute. This in turn permits the legal system to pursue
two ends at once. It can provide guidance and incentives through clearly
time apply lenient decision rules in hard
defined
80 rights, and at the same
cases.
Nevertheless, deception is not a promising solution to the irrationality
of following rules. The two forms of deception I have describeddeception about the nature of rules and deception about the relation
between conduct rules and judicial decision-can help to give serious
effect to rules. The first distracts actors from rational scrutiny of their
actions under rules, and the second enables the authority to threaten full
enforcement of rules without carrying through. Yet it should be obvious
that deliberate deception is not a reliable strategy for bringing about
compliance with legal rules. Official characterization of legal rules as
serious rules may not convince actors that it is always correct to follow
the rules. Discrepancies between conduct rules and decision rules may

be noticed, and, if they are, there is a serious risk that the conduct rules
will be undermined.
Moreover, it is unclear how an authority could carry out either of these
strategies in a deliberate way. A small group of officials would need to
be aware of the strategy to put it into effect, to keep it secret, and
inequitable, and unfair." Id. at 774.
Of course, both damages and specific performance are designed to protect the buyer's
expectancy, and in Panco, the results of the two remedies are theoretically the same.
Damages are measured by the difference between the agreed price, $5500, and the
market value, which was found to be $10,000. Thus, Mr. Panco pays $4500. Specific
performance would mean that Mr. Panco received $5500 from Mr. Rogers in exchange
for a house worth $10,000, a net loss for Mr. Panco of $4500. In practice, however, the
two remedies may not produce identical results. Damages may be subject to special
requirements of proof, to limits on idiosyncratic value, and to valuation by a jury, which
might be reluctant to impose a large liability on Mr. Panco. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 351, 352 (1981) (discussing foreseeability as a limit on
contract damages and certainty of proof of contract damages, respectively);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911, cmt. e (1979) (stating damages are measured
by claimant's subjective value, but do not include "sentimental" value); DOBBS, supra
note 73, at 308-09 (discussing objective and subjective valuation); 3 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 240-46, 252-54 (1990) (discussing
foreseeability and certainty).
Thus, the apparent rule-the conduct rule addressed to actors-is that in the event of a
breach of contract, the promisee is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. Presumably, this
reassurance encourages parties to enter into and rely on contracts. Yet the decision rule,
which includes the choice between specific performance and less-than-adequate
damages, permits some adjustment of final outcomes in response to cases like that of Mr.
Panco. Further, the obscurity and complexity of this decision rule screen it from public
view.
80. For a more detailed discussion of acoustic separation in contract enforcement,

see Sherwin, supra note 78, at 300-14.
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somehow to pass it on to future officials. And, even if all this could be
done, any form of deception raises serious questions about the
relationship between a governing authority and those who are subject to
its rules. An authority that respects the autonomy of its subjects will be
extremely reluctant to engage in deception.
The fact remains, therefore, that it is not rational for actors to follow
rules in every case, even though full compliance will yield better results
than particularistic decision-making. The rule-making authority cannot
eliminate this problem through the imposition of sanctions; nor can it
easily deceive its subjects about either the rules or the prospects for their
enforcement. It can only hope that actors will deceive themselves, in the
sense that they will not feel the need to deliberate in every case about
whether to follow the rules.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONSERVATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SERIOUS BUT
IMPERFECT RULES

I have argued that, at least in some circumstances, legal rules will be
most effective if they are treated as serious rules, to be obeyed in every
case that falls within their terms. Because rules are blunt, the actions
they require will not be correct in every case, judged by the ends the

rules are designed to advance. Thus, full compliance with rules means
that some errors will occur. It is also likely, however, that if people treat
rules as advisory rules, they will make mistakes in judging when they
are justified in violating the rules. And, if errors of this kind exceed the
errors associated with full compliance, a serious rule is the better choice.
I have also argued that a legal system cannot rely on sanctions to bring
about full compliance with rules. Rules must be administered by judges
who, unless they enforce the rules without question, will be reluctant to
impose sanctions on actors who were justified in breaking the rule.
Moreover, the perception that rules are applied too strictly can
undermine public respect for the legal system. Thus, although a threat of
sanctions can alter the balance of reasons for action, the threat will not
be credible to those who understand that rules are imperfect, believe that
they are justified in breaking the rules, and believe that judges will not
apply rules blindly.
Nor can a legal system rely on deliberate deception, either about rules
or about sanctions, to bring about compliance with rules. Deliberate
deception of the public by those who administer law is both impractical
and risky. It may be that rule-subjects often deceive themselves,

483

assuming without reflection that it is right to follow rules and that rules
will be enforced as written. But legal officials cannot easily or safely
engineer this attitude toward rules.
What this suggests is that an unreflective habit of obedience to rules
plays an important part in the success of a legal system. If we gave full
rational scrutiny to legal rules, we would not always follow them,
despite the possibility of sanctions, and we would not view them as
reliable evidence of what we and others ought to do. Yet, most of us
tend to obey the law fairly regularly, to feel guilty when we disobey, and
to disapprove of others who disobey-all without much thought.
I do not want to overstate my case. Unreflective acceptance of and
obedience to legal rules is not always essential to the effectiveness of
law; nor is it always desirable. One qualification to the importance of
habits of acceptance and obedience is that not all laws are or should be
serious rules. When there is doubt about the justification for a serious
rule-for example, if the authority's information is not clearly superior
to that of individuals, or if the benefits of coordination might be
overridden by the costs of conformity-the better choice may be no rule
at all, or an indeterminate standard.8 A standard that employs subjective
or normative terms will not function as a serious rule because it is open
to interpretation in context. But when the justification for a serious rule
is uncertain, a standard allows the authority to defer to actors with
special information ("salt to taste") or to customs and norms that reflect
the experience of many actors ("act reasonably," when the content of
reasonableness is informed by custom)., 2
There are also purposes for which advisory rules may be adequate,
although serious rules would be better. When the justification for a rule

is superior information in the hands of the authority or the likelihood of
cognitive bias, even an advisory rule will have some effect on
individuals' reasons for action. At least for those who are not confident
that their own judgment is correct, such a rule is evidence of the
authority's judgment that people are likely to err unless they follow the
rule, which in turn provides some evidence that the actor himself is

81. See, e.g., HART, supra note 25, at 124-32 (discussing the "open texture" of
law); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 6 at 266-67 (discussing the gradual development of
judicial rules); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 599-601 (1992) (discussing matters that are not easily amenable to rules);
Powers, supra note 31, at 1290 (noting that decision-makers may need time and
experience before formalizing law).
82. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines on Land Use Controls, 40 U. CFH. L. REv. 681, 728-33 (1973)
(favoring a standard of "neighborliness" in nuisance cases that takes its content from
custom).
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making a mistake. 3 To this extent, the rule can affect conduct even if it
is treated as merely advisory.
In the case of coordination rules, however, it is important that rules are
treated as serious rules, and therefore habits of acceptance and obedience
may be quite important to the rules' effectiveness. The value of a
coordination rule depends on the expectation that it will generally be
obeyed. If the rule is treated as an advisory rule, not only will people
sometimes have reason to disobey, but they also will sometimes err and
disobey when they should not. This greatly dilutes the benefit of the
rule, and may destroy it altogether if violations are so frequent that one
more will make no difference. In contrast, if most people are in the habit
of accepting legal rules as serious rules, actors who contemplate
disobedience will realize that their violations will set a bad example and
Thus,
detract from the value of an otherwise effective rule.
paradoxically, a widespread habit of obedience, not rational in itself, is
necessary to make obedience to coordination rules rational.Y
Coordination rules, moreover, make up a substantial and important

part of law. Broadly understood, coordination encompasses not only
specific enabling rules, such as rules governing contract formation, but
also any rule designed to settle moral and political disagreements. 5 As
long as subjects agree that the value of social peace exceeds the costs of
complying with a rule with which they would otherwise disagree, their
most important reason for action (peace) depends on coordination with
Thus, rules defining property rights and legal wrongs,
others.
interpretations of the Constitution, and entitlements to social support can
all fairly be viewed as coordination rules, if the value of compromise is
sufficiently high. And, in each of these cases, coordination will be more
effective and compromise more stable if most or all rule-subjects comply
out of habit and general respect for law, without undertaking a full
analysis of possible reasons to disobey.
Thus, habits of unreflective acceptance of and obedience to law
contribute substantially to the success of a legal system. In my view,
this observation about law has conservative implications. To the extent
that law relies on habitual, unthinking acceptance on the part of its
subjects, it is not a promising medium for dramatic social change.
A standard argument for restraint in legal interpretation and for
83.
84.
85.

See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
See Postema, supra note 16, at 172-78 (defining coordination).

conservatism generally is that any change in established practices and
institutions will have unintended consequences. Therefore, the bestintended reform may do more harm than good.86 To some extent, the
problems associated with rules support this standard argument, because
they expose certain irrational features of the operation of law. If law
cannot be fully rationalized, and if rules work best when some of their
defects are ignored, then comprehensive reform through law is
particularly risky.
This is not, however, the point I seek to make. Rather, the argument is
a narrower one, which depends on the limitations on law's effectiveness
rather than the riskiness of change. Rational and reflective actors will
not always comply with rules, particularly rules designed to bring about
coordination and compromise. Accordingly, as this Article has stated,
the law must rely to a considerable extent on the public's disposition to
accept legal rules as measures of correct conduct and obey legal rules
without reflection. These habits in turn depend on the familiarity of the
rules and the ability of actors to comply without sharply altering their
beliefs of the patterns of their lives. If law changes too quickly or
departs too radically from accepted views and practices, the necessary
habits of acceptance and obedience are likely to be dissipated. Put
another way, law may lose the very power that makes it so attractive to
reformers if it is used too aggressively to bring about social change.
It might be argued that the best way to encourage a general disposition
among actors to respect and follow legal rules is to make the law as
morally attractive as possible-if necessary, by means of radical reform.
Yet, while habits of obedience and acceptance depend in part on the
quality of law, they also depend on convenience and complacence. As
long as legal rules work tolerably well and can be readily assimilated to
one's accustomed way of life, it is easier to comply without reflection
86. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France,and on the
Proceedingsin Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event (1790), reprintedin

424, 453-54 (Peter L Stanlis ed.,
1963). The author wrote:
[T]he science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming
it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it
a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science; because the real
effects of moral causes are not always immediate .... [V]ery plausible
schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and
lamentable conclusions .... The science of government being.., a matter
which requires experience, and even more experience that any person can gain
in his whole life.... it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture
upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for
ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without
having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.

EDMUND BURKE, SELECTED WRrTINGS AND SPEECHES

Id. See also Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22

CONN. L. REv. 437, 456-57 (1990) (discussing the pitfalls of central planning).
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than to think through the full set of reasons for action. When legal rules
undertake to change the familiar social environment, actors may be
shocked into a full analysis of whether they ought to obey. When they
analyze rules in this way, they will not always obey; when they disobey,
they may be wrong; and the benefits of rules will be lost if this occurs

too often.
In our society, the disposition to obey law is probably strong enough
to permit the use of law to bring about social change in exceptional
cases. Brown v. Board of Educatio8 7 and the anti-discrimination laws
of the 1960s are obvious examples. But, if law is used routinely as a
means to social reform, its foundation of acceptance is placed at risk.
For example, there is evidence of increasing skepticism toward law in
the area of sexual harassment." The problem of sex has certainly caused
major setbacks for working women. But public response to the Bill
Clinton sex scandals suggests that strong legal constraints on sexual
maneuvers at work are too far out of harmony with the way people are
accustomed to behave. People laugh, 9 and, when they do, some damage
is done to their attitudes toward law.
This argument applies equally to enacted law and judicial decisions.
Unlike the standard conservative argument, however, it is limited to law
and should not be taken as a discouragement to radical ideas. In fact, it
implies a reason to support strong Constitutional freedoms that protect
dissent, which we are fortunate to have in place. Law, in my view, is not
a good means to accomplish social change. It can only respond to ideas
that have already worked their way to acceptance through public debate.
This makes protection of debate all the more important.

87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, When Reckless Laws Team Up, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25,
1998, § 4, at 15 (discussing sexual harassment laws and the independent counsel statute).
89. See, e.g., Live Cam in the Oval Office (last visited July 25, 1999)
<http://free.prohosting.com/~thumbs/ovalcaml.html>.
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